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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

G2-PR

25 APR 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: NIE-61: Consequences of Communist Control of the
Indian Subcontinent

1. Reference is made to CIA memorandum, subject as above,
dated 28 March 1952.

2. In accordance with request contained in reference memo-
randum, attached hereto as Tab "A" is the Department of the Army
contribution to NIE-61 prepared by the Office of the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, Department of the Army.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

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for HARVEY H. SMITH
Colonel, GS
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Incl
Tab "A" (8 cys)

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MISSING PAGE

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT MISSING PAGE(S):

Attachments 2

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PAGE "A"

G-2 CONTRIBUTION TO NIE-61: CONSEQUENCES OF
COMMUNIST CONTROL OVER THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT

I. HOW ARE WESTERN CAPABILITIES AFFECTED BY THE FACT THAT THE INDIAN
SUBCONTINENT IS NOT UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL?

A.1. What is the present strength and combat effectiveness of the ground forces of the subcontinent?

a. India

(1) Strength: Army 400,000 (2 corps headquarters, 6 inf divs, 1 armd div, 6 ind brigs, 6 ind brig grps, 1 ind preht brig, 1 ind armd brig, 3 ind regts, 36 ind bns)

(2) Combat Effectiveness. The Indian Army is considered a relatively effective fighting force, capable of maintaining internal security and of successfully resisting attack by any neighboring country. It is well trained only in small-unit tactics. Its strength lies in the excellent morale of its soldiers and their absolute loyalty to the Government. The main weakness of the Indian Army is the lack of trained and efficient officers, particularly in the higher grades. Numerous officers and enlisted men have had combat experience in Kashmir and some of the troops had combat experience in World War II as well.

b. Pakistan

(1) Strength: Army 200,000 (7 divs, 1 ind armd brig, 15 ind arty regts).

(2) Combat Effectiveness. The Army of Pakistan is well trained in small unit tactics. It is considered to have a relatively high degree of combat effectiveness, capable of maintaining internal security and of giving adequate defense of the northwestern borders of West Pakistan. Loyalty to the Government is generally good and discipline and morale are excellent. Active military experience of personnel is comparable to that of the Indian Army.

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c. Nepal

(1) Strength. Current estimates place the total strength of Nepal's armed forces at between 30,000 and 35,000, of which 7,000 are militia. Based on old reports, the Nepalese Army is believed to consist of approximately 15 infantry regiments of two battalions each, plus a small artillery unit of about 2,500 troops.

(2) Combat Effectiveness. The combat effectiveness of the Nepalese armed forces is considered to be extremely limited. They are estimated as being capable of maintaining effective internal security. The status of training is believed to be poor. The average soldier is easily disciplined, but is hampered by poor education and a low level of technical proficiency. The competency of the senior officers is poor by Western standards. Junior officers, serving with British and Indian forces, have had some combat experience in World War II, and are generally conscientious and hard-working. Current indications are that an Indian mission to Nepal is attempting to survey the military needs of the country, and that the Nepalese forces are destined to undergo a general reorganization and training program under Indian guidance. Such a program would undoubtedly improve the combat efficiency of the Nepalese forces.

d. Ceylon

(1) Strength. The Army of Ceylon, primarily for internal security, is limited by law to 3,000 officers and enlisted men. The present strength is 1,449 officers and enlisted men.

(2) Combat Effectiveness. The Ceylon Army possesses no combat effectiveness.

A.2. In a military sense, to what extent does the subcontinent serve as a deterrent to Communist expansion in Southeast Asia? the Middle East?

a. General. Significant barriers (mountains along the entire northern boundary of the Indian subcontinent; inadequate transportation

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routes traversing these mountains; the difficult terrain of Afghanistan and Iran to the west and Burma to the east; the Arabian Sea on the west, and the Bay of Bengal on the east) reduces the subcontinent's vulnerability to invasion. Conversely, these barriers would also hamper any efforts for military assistance to the Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian countries by nations of the subcontinent. The subcontinent, unlike the Italian and Balkan peninsula, does not constitute a "soft underbelly" for the invasion of Eurasia.

A.3. In what ways and to what extent would a non-Communist subcontinent affect the military position of the West in a global conflict with the USSR if it remained non-Communist and neutral? If it remained non-Communist and joined the Western Powers?

a. If it remained non-Communist and neutral, the subcontinent would have little or no effect on the military position of the West in a global conflict with the USSR. Because of its geographic location, a neutral subcontinent would undoubtedly afford some protection against interdiction by the USSR of east-west lines of air and sea communication.

b. If the subcontinent remained non-Communist and joined the Western Powers it could (excluding air and naval factors):

- (1) Provide an army in being of approximately 650,000, some 1,500,000 trained reservists, and a vast reservoir of manpower;
- (2) Provide significant amounts of small arms and ammunition; but in terms of other military items its contribution would be relatively small;
- (3) Tie down Communist troops in the Central Asian area to counter a possible threat by subcontinent forces or those of the Western Powers based on the subcontinent;
- (4) Provide a vital link in east-west air and sea communications; and
- (5) Create a probably favorable psychological effect on the peoples of the Middle East and Southeast Asia, thereby strengthening their will to resist military aggression by the Soviet Bloc.

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II. HOW WOULD SOVIET BLOC CAPABILITIES BE AFFECTED IF THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT CAME UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL (through cooperative Communist regimes)?

A.1. What effects (as distinguished from the denial factors to the West as discussed in Section 1-A) would a Communist subcontinent have on over-all Soviet Bloc capabilities?

a. Under Communist control, how would present subcontinent military forces affect Soviet Bloc capabilities for: (1) offensive operations against the Middle East and the Far East and (2) interfering with Western communications?

(1) Offensive operations against the Middle East and the Far East

Subcontinent forces now in being could be used in ground operations against the Middle East via Afghanistan and Iran or against Southeast Asia via Burma. However, the USSR and European Satellites in the case of the Middle East and the Chinese Communists in the case of Southeast Asia already have the capability of conducting successful operations in those areas. Furthermore, the difficulties which would be involved in the employment of the subcontinent forces, owing to geographic, economic, and political factors, would be such that the Soviet Bloc probably would not call on the subcontinent forces for military assistance in such operations. Communist control of the subcontinent would halt British recruiting of Gurkha personnel from Nepal, and would probably have an adverse psychological effect on the 6,000 or more Gurkhas now serving with the British forces in Malaya, thereby increasing Communist capabilities in the Far East by weakening the British capability to defend Malaya.

(2) Interfering with Western communications. No interference with ground communications.

b. To what extent could these subcontinent capabilities be increased without material assistance from the Soviet Bloc?

The military capabilities of the subcontinent could not be increased substantially without technical and materiel assistance from the Soviet Bloc. Indian arsenals and factories can produce all the small arms and small arms ammunition required for an army of about 500,000. In addition,

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Indian factories produce limited amounts of mortar projectiles, Bren guns, and other items of ordnance up to 5.5-inch artillery. There is practically no munitions industry in Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan would have to depend on the Soviet Bloc for substantial amounts of military equipment, particularly items of heavy equipment, and for certain raw materials and semi-finished items. There might initially be some temporary increase in military production, but only at the cost of transportation facilities and development projects. There are no munitions industries in Nepal and in Ceylon.

c. To what extent would the Soviet Bloc be able and likely to increase subcontinent military capabilities?

(1) A Communist Indian subcontinent would provide an army in being of about 650,000 men and a vast supply of manpower. India and Pakistan already have in excess of 1,500,000 trained reserves. The Soviet Bloc could probably develop considerable military potential on the Indian subcontinent in the form of armed forces and military bases. However, it is extremely unlikely that such a development would occur except as indicated below.

(2) Soviet strategy would not be served by a large-scale buildup of the armed forces of the subcontinent. The only two areas where such forces could be reasonably employed are Southeast Asia and the Middle East. As indicated above, terrain barriers and resulting difficulties of logistic support make such employment very unlikely. This view is strengthened by the fact that there already are adequate Chinese forces in being to occupy Southeast Asia and adequate Soviet forces for successful operations in the Middle East. Further, in view of India's limited industrial capacity, the mobilization of subcontinent military potential would require Soviet backing in the form of military supplies and equipment or substantial assistance to develop India's munitions industry. The USSR would not be likely to make this effort because of the limited return she could receive. However, the Soviets could and might assist, if necessary, in the formation of local defense forces for internal security and a ground force threat against Afghanistan in the event it were not

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already dominated by the Soviet.

(3) With regard to military bases, the Soviets would probably wish to establish air and naval bases from which forces could operate against Allied sea and air communications routes connecting the Pacific and the Middle East. It is unlikely that Soviet ground forces would be based in the subcontinent.

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